This article carefully debunks each major tenet of the L3C "movement" and reveals the legal and practical realities under "the Emperor's New Clothes. " Using foundation funds to offer market-rate returns to "tranched" investors is, at best, a complicated device; not appropriate for "branding" and simplistic appeals to social conscience. When a foundation contemplates making a program-related investment, the matter requires careful, individualized, professional assessment, not reliance on a branded template. In this context, the L#C is but a snare and a delusion.
L3C proponents tout the device as a breakthrough in charitable giving-a simple, wise, and useful development in the law of limited liability companies---destined to be fast-tracked for special treatment under the provisions of the Code that deal with PRIs by charitable foundations.! Unfortunately, these glowing characterizations are flatly wrong.?
The "L3C" is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance; its very existence is inherently misleading. Due to technical flaws, the current L3C legislation is nonsensical and useless. Moreover, the notion that an L3C should have privileged status under the Code is inescapably at odds with the key policies underpinning the relevant Code sections. The L3C is not on track-let alone on a fast track-to any special status under the Code.
Debunking "The Emperor's New Clothes" should be done painstakingly, thus this article proceeds through several parts. Part II summarizes the L3C concept and its proponents' claims. Part m provides background on the limited liability company and highlights the aspects of LLC statutes relevant to a discussion of L3Cs. Part IV explains the concept of PRIs. Part V critiques the L3C construct and exposes its fundamental flaws under several different areas of law, including the law of limited liability companies, securities regulations, and PRIs. Part VI concludes with a call to repudiate the L3C construct. 
II. THE L3C CONSTRUCT
On its face, L3C legislation appears simple and innocuous. The legislation amends a state's existing limited liability company statute to create a subcategory of LLC subject to special restrictions as to purpose, and special requirements as to name. An LLC becomes a "low-profit limited liability company" by proclaiming the status in its articles of organization" and including a special L3C designator in its name.1 2 By statute, an L3C's purposes are tightly restricted. The restrictions are designed to implement the L3C's central purpose-"to dovetail with the federal IRS regulations relevant to Program Related Investments (PRIs) by foundations""-so as to allow foundations to invest some of their assets in private, profit-making enterprises formed to advance socially desirable goals. The dovetailing is evident from the language of the restrictions, which derive from the Treasury Regulations delineating permissible PRIs" and cite sections of the IRC. The Vermont statute, for example, establishes the following requirements for a low-profit limited liability company:
(A) The company:
seeing encourages the diversion of charitable assets away from the nonprofit sector and toward a new and untried corporate form that may lack the supervision state charity officials now exercise over true public charities." Letter from Chris Cash, President, Nat'l Ass'n of State Charity Officials, to Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, and Senator Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate (B) No significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property; provided, however, that the fact that a person produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. Although by statute an L3C must have a charitable or educational purpose," the L3C's raison d'dtre is to combine foundation money with money from entrepreneurial investors."
The central premise of an L 3 CS operation is its use of low-cost capital in high risk ventures and its ability to allocate risk and
The cited section of the IRC defines the term "charitable contribution" in relevant part as:
[A] contribution or gift to or for the use of... [a] foundation ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensuring some a very safe investment with market return. As is appropriate under the PRI structure, foundations could assume the top risk at very low return, making the rest of the investment far more secure."
Thus, an L3C exists to (i) receive foundation money through the PRI mechanism and then (ii) leverage that money with investments from forprofit private investors. As a matter of regulatory law, L3C proponents claim that L3C status will streamline the PRI process.
20 As a matter of finance, L3C proponents extol the benefits of "tranched investing" as a means of social change." The L3C construct facilitates tranched investing with the PRI usually taking first risk position thereby taking much of the risk out of the venture for other investors in lower tranches. The rest of the investment levels or tranches become more attractive to commercial investment by improving the credit rating and
This claim is debunked infra Part V. The principal proponent of the L3C appears to be Robert Lang and Americans for Community Development, an L3C created by Mr. Lang. See Americans for Community Development, http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org (last visited June 1, 2010). According to that website:
Americans for Community Development was formed to turn the L 3 C into a major force in American philanthropy to better meet the mission of helping communities and the people who live there throughout the world. The L 3 C is a new form of limited liability company (LLC) that combines the best features of the LLC with the social conscience of a non-profit. Robert Lang, CEO 
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thereby lowering the cost of capital. It is particularly favorable to equity investment. Because the foundations take the highest risk at little or no return, it essentially turns the venture capital model on its head and gives many social enterprises a low enough cost of capital that they are able to be self sustainable.
22
Note that the foundation creates the financial base for the project. The foundation's position involves a high-risk/low-gain investment rather than a more traditional grant. 23 Additional capital comes from sources seeking to make at least some profit.
24
Proponents of the L3C have high hopes for its utility and impact.
25
According to these proponents, before the creation of the L3C, foundations had to move cautiously when considering PRIs due to the high transactional costs and bureaucratic hurdles. 26 Consequently, PRIs were not common and certainly did not provide a major impetus to socially beneficial investing.
27
With the L3C in place, L3C proponents predict substantial change:
The L 3 C ... makes it very easy for lawyers and laymen alike to grasp since it does not create a new structure but merely amends the definition section of the 1lc [sic] acts in most states .... Probably more importantly than anything else, the L 3 C is a brand which stands for all this and more and hopefully as a brand will make the concepts easy to grasp and thereby frequently used. protection. In its simplest manifestation, that cost consisted of double taxation of a business's profits. An ordinary C corporation is a taxable entity; it pays dividends out of its aftertax "earnings and profits." Those profits are then generally taxed again in the hands of the shareholders when distributed to them in the form of dividends.
Partners avoid this double-taxation because partnerships are not taxable entities. Partnership profits (whether distributed or not) are deemed to pass through to the partners, at which level they are taxed but once. Partners can also benefit directly from partnership losses, which also pass through and can serve as deductions for the individual partners. In contrast, the losses of an ordinary corporation stay with the entity, and are thus useful only if the entity later enjoys a profit. Partnerships are also advantageous in other realms, including the treatment of a partner's basis in his interest.
The problem with partnerships has, of course, been personal liability. Prior to the advent of limited liability partnerships and limited liability limited partnerships [developments that followed the advent of LLCs], at least one partner of every partnership had to be liable for the business's debts-thus the tax-shield conundrum."
In the early days of LLCs, tax classification constraints produced a "family resemblance" among most LLCs," but in 1997 the IRS's "check-thebox regulations" eliminated all connection between an LLC's structure and the entity's eligibility for partnership tax status." There remain, however, certain essential characteristics of the LLC:
BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 11.01[2], at 1-9 to -10 (footnotes omitted).
"Work-arounds" existed before the advent of LLCs, most notably S Corporations and limited partnerships, but each work-around carried its own problems. Id. A creature of state law, each LLC is organized under an LLC statute that creates the company, gives it a legal existence separate from its owners (called "members"), shields those members from partner-like vicarious liability, governs the company's operations, and controls how and when the company comes to an end."
Under all LLC statutes, the rules governing relations among the members and the LLC are almost entirely "default" rules-i.e., subject to change by agreement among the members. Typically, the members' agreement is called the "operating agreement," and the operating agreement is the "cornerstone" or "chartering agreement" of each LLC. 40 According to the Official Comments to the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, "an LLC's operating agreement serves as the foundational contract among the entity's owners,"
41 and "flexibility of management structure is a hallmark of the limited liability company."42
IV. PROGRAM RELATED INVESTMENTS (PRIs) EXPLAINED
In order to understand the nature and importance of PRIs, it is first necessary to understand the status of foundations under the Code and the 
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protective limitations the Code and Treasury Regulations impose on foundations. 43 In particular, it is necessary to understand the prohibitions on speculative investments and the requirement that foundations annually distribute a specified portion of their assets.
Private foundations enjoy tax-exempt status" and exist within a myriad of tax regulations designed to protect charitable assets from imprudent management and diversion to the benefit of non-charitable purposes or private persons. 45 These regulations have strong teeth; contravention brings excise taxes so heavy that one expert has described them as "toxic."
46 Speculative investments and investments for improper organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
Id; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-1(c)(2) ("An organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals."). The regulations are also intended to protect the commercial realm from unfair competition from enterprises that benefit from tax-exempt status. E.g. 48 but also "on the participation of any foundation manager in the making of the investment, knowing that it is jeopardizing the carrying out of any of the foundation's exempt purpose. . . ." Moreover, "private inurement" (i.e., benefits to ineligible purposes or persons) can destroy a foundation's tax-exempt status.so This prohibition has "zero tolerance," at least in theory." In addition, foundations face nearly confiscatory taxes to the extent they fail to properly distribute at least 5% of their assets annually."
These regulatory provisions, strict both in substance and in penalty, create the context in which PRIs make sense. The function and virtue of a Program Related Investment are (1) to permit private foundations to make investments, rather than grants, in mission-appropriate enterprises; (2) without the investments being considered speculative or otherwise "jeopardizing"; (3) with the investments counting toward the minimum annual payout required of foundations.
The enabling regulations, however, are strict:
A program-related investment is an investment which possesses the following characteristics:
(i) The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) [charitable purposes];
(ii) No significant purpose of the investment is the production of income or the appreciation of property; and 
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(iii) No purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D) [influence legislation/elections].
4
Although at first glance all three requirements seem generic, the first requirement is actually foundation-mission specific:
An investment shall be considered as made primarily to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) if it signficantly furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation's exempt activities and if the investment would not have been made but for such relationship between the investment and the accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities."
Consequently, each time a foundation considers making a PRI, the foundation must make a situation-specific determination that carefully takes into account the foundation's mission, the purpose of the organization receiving the investment, the relationship of the receiving organization's purpose to the foundation's mission, and how the governance and financial structure of the receiving organization ensures that the receiving organization will operate within the PRI requirements. At a minimum, the last-mentioned issue requires the foundation to carefully monitor the activities of the receiving organization." 6 Prudence likely requires a substantial amount of control." Either way, devising a PRI arrangement requires careful and individualized investigation, deliberation, negotiation, and drafting. An [A]n investment which ceases to be program-related because of a critical change in circumstances shall in no event subject the foundation making the investment to the tax imposed by section 4944(a)(1) before the 30th day after the date on which such foundation (or any of its managers) has actual knowledge of such critical change in circumstances.
Id.
57 Bishop, supra note 43, at 263 ("[P]resumably the controls granted by the foundation over the LLC guaranteed that the foundation would exercise proper expenditure oversight authority to negate the § 4945 taxable expenditure tax.").
HeinOnline --35 Del. J. Corp. L. 891 2010 opinion of counsel is almost de rigueur, and prudence sometimes warrants seeking a private letter ruling from the IRS."
The IRS issued only one public ruling on PRIs. The ruling involved "a fairly innocuous private foundation that provided low interest rate loans to blind persons to allow them to establish their own businesses."" To date, the IRS has issued only one private letter ruling concerning a PRI to a limited liability company."o The ruling described a receiving organization subject to substantial ongoing control by the investing foundation." 1 The private letter ruling did not pertain to an L3C and did not involve the use of program related investments as a lure for investors seeking a full market rate of return. Indeed, the type of tranched investments advocated by L3C proponents is novel for PRIs, 62 and, as explained below, the tranch approach raises conflict of interest issues between foundation and marketoriented investors." This tension increases the need for careful, situation-5 1d. at 258-59; see also Spenard, supra note 21, at 39.
Perhaps the reason many private foundations approach some PRI transactions with caution is that they realize arrangements between charitable entities and for-profit entities can be very complex, and intentionally investing their assets in transactions expected to produce below-market returns is inherently risky. The reason many private foundations seek private letter rulings may be because they understand that PRI transactions that push the envelope in terms of producing income or the appreciation of property should be approached with caution. Id. Compare the attitude of insouciance expressed on the website of the L3C's principal proponent: "We honestly believe if an L 3 C is used and the IRS regulations are followed there will not be an issue. No one asks permission to drive the posted speed limit why ask the The approach also concerns regulators: It is important to point out that "low-profit" in the context of an L3C does not necessarily describe a situation in which each participant investing in the venture is agreeing to a low-profit or below-market return. Rather, the L3C provides a structure through which there is an uneven allocation of risks and expected returns. Spenard, supra note 21, at 37; see also Chemoff, supra note 9, at 5 ("This author [proponents of L3Cs] is just cynical enough to suggest that some people supporting L3Cs are doing so because
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HeinOnline --35 Del. J. Corp. L. 892 2010 specific planning by foundations considering making a program related investment into a tranched low-profit limited liability company. In addition, the tranch approach creates special risks of private inurement, which likewise require careful forethought, planning, and monitoring. Depending on how much an L3C is tilted toward the marketrate investors, the investing foundation risks being seen as benefitting-even as a side effect-substantial numbers of individuals distinct from the foundation's purpose. In that situation, the foundation's benevolent purpose will not save it from a private inurement problem."
In sum, when a foundation considers making a PRI, prudence requires a careful, individualized, and professional approach, even-perhaps especially-when the proposed receiving organization is an L3C."
V. THE L3C CONCEPT DEBUNKED
L3C proponents see the low-profit limited liability company almost as a conceptual messiah, come to lead charitable giving and socially conscious investors to a new Jerusalem."
The homepage for Americans for L3Cs would provide opportunities for entrepreneurs and for-profit developers to tap into a new market for low-cost funding for projects that do well for them and also happen to do some public good.") "See Canada v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 973 (1984) . As explained by the court: Respondent [IRS] contends that the KLCC [Kneadmore Life Community Church] was operated to a substantial degree for nonexempt purposes in that it benefited private interests. Specifically, respondent points out that community members could live on, raise animals and grow crops for personal consumption and for sale on, and conduct businesses on, community land without paying rent to the KLCC and that the KLCC carried on communal activities such as community gardens and orchards and communal use of KLCC farm equipment and seeds. Moreover, students (or ex-students) from Indiana University were often drawn to the community for the purpose of exploring alternative lifestyles. Id. at 981. The Tax Court ruled against KLCC, despite "accept[ing] the sincerity of the beliefs of the members of the KLCC, the religious character of their beliefs, and the assertion that the KLCC was their chosen instrument alike for furthering their beliefs." Id. at 982. If a tranched L3C tilts too heavily toward the market-oriented investors, the private benefit analysis may be analogous. For a further discussion of this issue, see Bishop, supra note 43, at 263. "See e.g., Brewer & Rhim, supra note 20, at 18. The arrival of the L3C potentially is a watershed moment for individuals and organizations that are dedicated to achieving social change. By combining the unique features of an LLC with the "soul" of a nonprofit, the L3C may result in dramatic increases in the availability of both private and philanthropic capital for ventures that are designed to further charitable and educational purposes. Elsewhere the L3C has been touted as "A New Solution to New Problems,"" 9 with the power, for example, to revitalize industries that are "suffering from increased global competition." 0 Possible applications include "nonprofit structure for museums, concert halls, symphonies, recreational facilities and the hundreds of thousands of nonprofits that perform service for the government under contract, with the government as their primary source of revenue.""
Id; see also
The key to the L3C is its supposed superior connection to PRIs. 
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The states that enacted L3C legislation apparently accept this connection without hesitation. Legislative history on each enactment is scant, but the available information demonstrates that legislative sponsors relied uncritically on information provided by L3C proponents and portrayed L3Cs as having great upside potential and no downsides. For example, many of the relevant legislators' remarks focused on the L3C's supposed PRI fast track.
Some of these legislators simply repeated the sentiments of Americans for Community sector .... [The L3C] will become a vehicle for bringing in more money to socially beneficial entities without compromising the return."" The L3C is "a new tool for social enterprise,"" 4 with the potential to "unleash more funding for for-profit companies with social missions.""
The potential is apparently enormous because the L3C will allow the "tranching" of investments. At the lowest level or "tranch," a foundation will make a low-return, high-risk investment in a "venture[] with modest financial prospects, but the possibility of major social impact."" At the next level, the venture will draw investments from socially conscious investors willing to take a below-market return for the sake of participating in a progressive form of free enterprise that will help make a better world. At the top level, the venture will be able to attract regular, profit-maximizing and again I have seen companies pass up opportunities to invest in LLCs ... due to an inability to establish a concrete tax exemption for the plausible investment endeavor."); Michigan Senator Jason 
.").
One legislator went so far as to directly support Robert Lang's proposition that the IRS will necessarily adopt the L3C model, stating that "there are enough states now that are pursuing this that it looks like the IRS will be able to adopt and sanction this without the need for the private letter rulings that they've had to give in these instances. -news&refho-288&category-2008% 20Lane%20Reports (last visited Feb. 18, 2010 . This investment will come from funds that a foundation might otherwise distribute as a grant to a non-profit venture.
HeinOnline --35 Del. J. Corp. L. 895 2010 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW investors whose participation at market rates is made possible by the subsidization of the lower two tranches.
"Because the foundations take the highest risk at little or no return, it essentially turns the venture capital model on its head and gives many social enterprises a low enough cost of capital that they are able to be self sustainable."" Thus, the L3C has the potential to "leverage foundations' program-related investments to access trillions of dollars of market-driven capital . . . .""
Unfortunately, this conceptual messiah is a pretender; this emperor lacks clothes. L3Cs have no special ability to promote PRIs, and the L3C construct is unnecessary, unwise, and inherently misleading. Current L3C legislation is so technically flawed that it undermines the very arrangements it seeks to promote. Moreover, the L3C "movement" owed much of its initial momentum to its claim that the IRC would be changed to give special preference to foundation investments in L3Cs." That claim has now evaporated.
A. The L3C is Unnecessary
According to its proponents:
The central premise of an L3C's operation is its use of low-cost capital in high risk ventures and its ability to allocate risk and reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensuring some a very safe investment with market return. As is appropriate under the PRI structure, foundations could assume the top risk at very low return, making the rest of the investment far more secure.
80
In fact, this type of complex arrangement is possible under every state's regular LLC statute. L3C proponents acknowledge that flexibility of nL3C Advisors, supra note 13. 
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[Vol. 35 structure is the hallmark of the limited liability company: "The L 3 C was built on the llc [sic] structure in order to provide the flexibility of membership and organization needed to cover a wide variety of social enterprise situations."8 L3C legislation adds nothing by permitting a limited liability company to have a "low profit" purpose. Many LLC statutes no longer require a forprofit purpose. 82 For those that do, "low profit" certainly qualifies. No LLC statute requires a limited liability company to seek the highest possible profit margin. Moreover, by hypothesis, many L3Cs will, in fact, seek high-yield returns for at least some of their members.
An ordinary LLC can certainly be structured to receive and make use of foundation PRIs. Indeed, the private letter ruling often mentioned in connection with L3Cs involved an ordinary limited liability company.
83
In sum, from the perspective of state entity law, there is nothing an L3C can do that cannot already be done through an ordinary LLC.
84

B. The L3C "Brand" is Unwise
The proponents of the L3C claim that:
The L 3 C . .. makes it very easy for lawyers and laymen alike to grasp since it does not create a new structure but merely amends the definition section of the 1lc [sic] acts in most states .... Probably more importantly than anything else, the 8 'L3C Advisors, supra note 13. commentator, with more than 20 years of PRI practice experience, characterized as "nonsense" the notion that "[a] private foundation could not make a PRI in an LLC before L3Cs were authorized." Chemoff, supra note 9, at 4. Mr. Chemoff explains:
For years, tax practitioners-both in-house and outside legal counsel-have structured and closed PRIs in the form of purchases of membership interests in regular LLCs with multiple members. They have often done this by including charitable purposes language and prohibitions against use of funds for political purposes or lobbying in the LLC's operating agreement and purchase agreement for the membership interests.
Id. at 4-5.
HeinOnline --35 Del. J. Corp. L. 897 2010 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW L3C is a brand which stands for all this and more and hopefully as a brand will make the concepts easy to grasp and thereby frequently used."
As explained above," the L3C's principal selling point is its supposed ability to attract PRIs, and the L3C is described as specifically designed "to dovetail with the federal IRS regulations relevant to Program Related Investments (PRIs) by foundations." " But PRI ventures are anything but "easy to grasp." The regulations are complex, and L3C legislation does nothing to remove that complexity." In addition, investments by charitable foundations into profit-making ventures raise a host of complicated non-tax issues, including, for example, potential conflicts of fiduciary duty for the foundation trustees, securities law concerns, and "exit rights" for the foundation. In these circumstances, a "brand" is simplistic and dangerous."
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the great complexity. First, consider the amount of control that each foundation must retain over any L3C enterprise into which the foundation invests. As explained in Part IV, making sure that a foundation's investment qualifies as a PRI requires a very fact-intensive analysis of the purposes of the foundation, the purposes of the investment vehicle, and the foundation's ability to control the investment vehicle." http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/documentsites/legislativepublications/Study/ 20Reports%20to%20the% 202007%20NCGA/NC%2OApplied%20Fumiture%20Technology%2OCenter.pdf("The Com-mittee heard a presentation on low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs) ... [which] have been proposed as a means for encouraging investment in struggling business enterprises [but] [t]he Committee was concerned about ensuring that investment in a L 3 C by a non-profit would qualify as a program-related investment so that the non-profit would not run afoul of IRS regulations.").
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See supra Part IV (explaining the nature of the determination and showing how designating an entity as "low-profit" does not reduce the complexity or fact-specific nature of each determination); supra Part I, at 2-3 (explaining how L3C proponents initially claimed that the IRC would be amended to "green light" foundation investments into L3Cs).
"The issues discussed in the following text apply equally to an ordinary limited liability company used as a vehicle to receive PRIs. The point is not that such issues are "deal breakers" or otherwise pose insurmountable difficulties. Rather, the point is that the idea ofan L3C "brand"-i.e., a simple, off the shelf mechanism-is unwise and inherently misleading. 90See supra Part IV. As will be demonstrated infra Part V(C), the L3C will do nothing to facilitate the PRI determination or to simplify the process of PRI analysis.
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The foundation must at least assure itself that it can prevent the L3C from deviating from the "program related" purposes that brought the foundation into the enterprise in the first place. Such protection is certainly possible, but there are numerous ways to structure the protection. Each possible variation has implications for the foundation and for each of the other investors in the L3C. Finding the proper "deal point" takes sophisticated analysis-business as much as legal-and requires careful, tailored drafting of the L3C's operating agreement. Inevitably, thoughtful negotiation is also required. There is nothing "off the shelf" about this type of endeavor, and the supposed L3C "template" does nothing to facilitate the analysis, the negotiation, or the drafting."
Next, consider the possible conflicts of interests for those managing a foundation that has made an important PRI into an operating business. The managers of the foundation have a duty to the foundation to maintain some oversight of the business.
92 The L3C's operating agreement will therefore have to provide for that oversight, and it is likely that a representative of the foundation will have some governance role in the business."
Suppose, however, that at some point the interests of the foundation and those of the "top tranch" investors substantially diverge. Assume, for example, that: (i) a foundation makes a PRI into a business that operates a factory in an economically depressed area; (ii) the business develops intellectual property that is so valuable that a foreign corporation wishes to
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See Posting of Robert Lang to triplepundit, http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/04/13c-willthe-irs-favor-social-progress ("The L3C templates a deal, brands it and makes it easier to construct.") (last visited Feb. 8, 2010 Where a social enterprise is dedicated to social outcomes but requires participation by for-profit capital investment, the two can easily be brought together under the roof of a single LLC because the membership agreement can reward the for-profit investors with a large share of any profits, while the social benefit nonprofit actors can retain ultimate decision-making power and thereby ensure that the firm remains committed to its social and/or environmental purpose.
Id.
3
The foundation might obtain sufficient control by imposing lender-like positive and negative covenants, including veto power over specified categories of decisions. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp. 2010) ("A limited liability company agreement may provide rights to any person, including a person who is not a party to the limited liability company agreement, to the extent set forth therein."); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, § 112(a) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 449 (2008) ("An operating agreement may specify that its amendment requires the approval of a person that is not a party to the operating agreement or the satisfaction of a condition. An amendment is ineffective if its adoption does not include the required approval or satisfy the specified condition."). Of course, this approach would require very careful analysis, negotiation, and drafting. acquire the business in order to acquire the intellectual property; (iii) the foreign corporation is willing to continue operating the factory for three more years, but no longer; (iv) the takeover will be highly profitable for the top tranch investors, and they naturally want the deal to go through; and (v) the middle tranch investors may be conflicted, since by hypothesis they have invested in part to make money and in part to "do good." Assume further that the takeover cannot occur without the consent of the foundation's representative. Presumably, the foundation does not want the factory to close and would prefer to use the value of the intellectual property to continue to subsidize the important social enterprise (i.e., the factory and the jobs it provides).
If the L3C's operating agreement fails to address this situation very carefully, the foundation's representative may be hopelessly conflictedcaught among duties to the entity, loyalty to the foundation's goals, and duties to the top tranch investors. Those who manage a limited liability company have fiduciary duties not only to the entity, 94 but also, in some circumstances, directly to the members."
Moreover, because the foundation's representative will be serving, in essence, as a deputy of the foundation, any breach of duty by the representative will likely inculpate the foundation." In Illinois, in particular, representatives of all cooperating organizations may be conflicted." To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability company or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement, the member's or manager's or other person's duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement .... (West 2004) . This statute provides for a non-profit corporation to defend and indemnify a person acting in the person's "official capacity" and defines that term to mean:
Id
[W]ith respect to a director, officer, or employee of the corporation who, while a director, officer, or employee of the corporation, is or was serving at the request of the corporation or whose duties in that position involve or involved service as a director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or agent of another organization or employee benefit plan, the position of that person as a director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or agent, as the case may be, of the other organization or employee benefit plan. (West Supp. 2010) . In Illinois, a charitable trustee has the duties to "avoid. . . Further complexity exists due to federal and state law regulating securities. Generally, the "investment contract" analysis applies to determine whether a membership interest in an LLC is a security." The determination is highly significant and carries high risk; both federal and state statutes impose significant registration and disclosure requirements on ventures that "issue" securities (even those whose securities are not publicly traded). The "investment contract" analysis is complex, but essentially turns on whether a person is investing in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits to be made chiefly through the efforts of others. That question depends largely on the extent investors have a right (and, in some circumstances, the practical ability) to manage the enterprise. Day-to-day control is not necessary to avoid securities status, but certainly manager-managed LLCs are more likely to involve securities than are member-managed LLCs." 9 For an L3C, the securities law determination will be especially complicated because nominally, at least, the foundations will not be investing with any expectation of profit'o and yet will need some fundamental control over the enterprise. Depending on how fundamental that control is, its existence could increase the likelihood that the other investors are purchasing a security from the L3C when they become members (co-owners) of the L3C. In any event, the securities determination will differ for each tranch of investors.
Consider also the question of "exit rights"-the right of an investor to have its interests bought out by either the other owners or the venture itself. The question of exit rights is fundamental in any investment made in a business whose interests are not publicly traded, and the question has manifold complexity.'o' The other side of the issue is whether the venture can require that a particular owner exit the venture.' 
